Abstract
Introduction
Non-interference has become a popular concept for formalizing security. Its main benefit over access control models like the one by Bell and LaPadula [1] or Biba [2] is that it provides a definition of security rather than only a mechanism for enforcing it. The initial work on non-interference by Goguen and Meseguer [6, 7] was limited to deterministic systems. Beginning with Sutherland [18] , various generalizations of non-interference for non-deterministic systems have been proposed, e.g. [9, 12, 20] . In this article, we consider confidentiality aspects of security and focus on possibilistic definitions of security. The underlying idea of this approach is that information cannot be deduced by observing a system because the set of possible behaviours which may have generated a given observation is too large. For a discussion of benefits and limitations of the possibilistic approach we refer to [11, 13] .
The variety of definitions of possibilistic security indicates that there might not be a definition which is optimal for all purposes. Rather, the choice of such a definition depends on the particular application. This demands for a uniform framework in which one can compare different definitions and choose the most appropriate one. McLean's selective interleaving functions [12, 14] provide such a framework in which security can be defined by closure conditions, but Zakinthinos and Lee pointed out that the expressiveness of his framework is too limited [20] . Their framework overcomes this limitation and allows them to define a perfect security property PSP. However, the general correspondence between closure conditions and security is lost. The framework presented in this article seeks to combine the expressiveness of the one by Zakinthinos and Lee with the elegance of McLean's framework while overcoming their limitations. One novelty of our framework is its modular structure. It consists of a collection of basic security predicates which can be combined to security predicates in order to define a notion of security. Thus, our framework really is an assembly kit for such definitions in which basic security predicates are the building blocks. This modularity also reduces the complexity of reasoning about security, because many properties of the building blocks are preserved under combinations. New basic building blocks can be defined using a general schema which ensures that each basic security predicate corresponds to a closure condition.
This correspondence forms the theoretical basis for an investigation of the compatibility of security with other system properties which is an important criterion in the selection of a definition of security. As examples, we investigate properties which require certain types of non-critical information flow. We demonstrate that PSP is incompatible with some of these properties and derive the pretty good security predicate PGSP as a less restrictive definition which allows the respective types of information flow.
The correspondence to closure conditions also provides a basis for a stepwise development of secure systems. Although, security is not preserved under refinement [9] in general, we show that certain definitions of security are preserved under intersection which is a special case of refinement.
After some basic definitions in Section 2, we introduce our framework in Section 3. We present a collection of basic security predicates in Section 4 and show how to assemble these basic predicates into well-known definitions of possibilistic security in Section 5. In Section 6 we investigate the compatibility of security with other system properties and derive PGSP in our framework in order to overcome certain incompatibilities of PSP. In Section 7 we consider the preservation of security in a stepwise development process. We discuss our approach in relation to previous work in Section 8. Finally, in Section 9 we summarize our achievements and remark on future plans.
Preliminaries
Following [20] we model non-deterministic systems using event systems. Computation steps and interactions are modeled by events, i.e. actions without duration, like e.g. assigning a value to a variable or sending a message. We distinguish between input, internal, and output events. Input events are not controlled by the system but rather by some external environment while all other events are controlled by the system. The interface of a system is modeled by the input and output events and its executions by traces, i.e. sequences of events. Thus, a system can be specified by a set of traces which models its possible behaviours.
Definition 1.
An event system Ëis a tuple´ Á Ç Trµ where is a set of events, Á , Ç respectively are the input and output events, and Tr ¾ È´ £ µ is the set of traces. We denote the set of finite sequence over by £ .
Each trace Ø ¾ Tr is a finite sequence of events in and Tr must be closed under prefixes.
For the definition of security policies we assume a set of security domains such that each such domain is an abstraction from concrete entities, like e.g. individual users, groups of users, processes, or collections of files. A security domain dom´ µ is associated with each event using a function dom . A non-interference relation, an irreflexive relation ¢ , can then be used to specify which information flows are restricted between domains, e.g. ½ ¾ states that ½ must not interfere with ¾ for domains ½ ¾ . Finally, a security policy Pol is a triplé dom µ. Pol is called transitive if , the complement of , is transitive. Unless explicitely stated otherwise, we consider transitive security policies in this article.
For transitive security policies, in principle, it suffices to consider two domains À and Ä only, a high and a lowlevel. In the subsequent sections we will make use of this abstraction and consider the two-level security policy Pol À Ä with domains À and Ä and the non-interference relation which demands À Ä.
In order to prove that a systems satisfies a given security policy it is necessary to define formally what is meant by " ½ does not interfere with ¾ ", i.e. must be given a semantics in terms of event systems. The formal definition of this phrase can be regarded as a definition of security. Consequently a security property is defined by a security policy together with a definition of security. Non-inference, generalized non-interference, and restrictiveness are well-known examples among the various possibilistic security properties which have been proposed for non-deterministic systems.
When proving that a system satisfies a given security policy one shows for each domain that the non-interference relation is respected. Since the security policy Pol À Ä is fixed we can focus on the different definitions of security in the remainder of this article. Therefore, we use the term "definition of security" instead of "security property".
Notational Conventions
We assume that Ëis an event system´ Á Ç Trµ where denotes a set of events, Á and Ç, respectively, the sets of input and output events in , and Tr a set of traces over . Individual events are denoted by , sequences of events by « or ¬ and by or Ø -if they are traces. A dot concatenates events to form sequences, e.g. ½ ¾ ¿ . We deliberately use a dot also for appending sequences, e.g. « ¬, « , and « ¬. The empty sequence is denoted by and the projection of a given trace Ø to a set of events ¼ by Ø ¼ . Ø ¼ results from Ø by deleting all events not in ¼ . We use À and Ä, the names of the high-and low-level domains, also to denote the subsets of events in with domain À and Ä. À Á , ÄÁ, À Ç , and ÄÇ denote the corresponding sets of input and output events. Events in Ä, À, À Á , and À Çare denoted respectively by Ð, , , and Ó.
Subscripts and primes are used in combination with all of these denotations.
A Framework for Possibilistic Security
The confidentiality of classified information can only be ensured if direct as well as indirect flows of information are restricted. An observer must neither directly observe information for which he does not possess the appropriate clearance nor be able to deduce such information from other observations. In order to prevent direct information flow certain aspects of the system behaviour must not be observable. Here, we assume that only low-level events are observable on the low-level, i.e. for a trace the sequence Ä can be observed. However, in the worst case an observer who has complete knowledge of the system, can construct all system behaviours which generate a given observation, and try to deduce confidential information from this set. Formally, such an observer constructs the low-level equivalence set LLES´Tr µ Ø ¾ Tr Ø Ä Ä (introduced in [20] ) from the observation Ä and the knowledge about the system.
The underlying idea of possibilistic security is to demand that LLES´Tr µ is so large that an observer cannot deduce confidential information from it. Any trace in LLES´Tr µ could have generated the observation Ä and, unless is the only element in LLES´Tr µ, one cannot deduce that has actually occurred. 1 However, even if LLES´Tr µ has more than one element, the deduction of confidential information may still be possible. If certain high-level behaviours are compatible with a given observation but others are not then one deduces from this observation that one of the former high-level behaviours has occurred but not any of the latter ones. Such channels may cause a system to be insecure because they could be exploited by Trojan horses for example. In order to avoid this, a possibilistic security property demands that if a given high-level behaviour is compatible with some observation then certain other highlevel behaviours must be compatible with it as well. Thus, LLES´Tr µ must be closed wrt. some criterion. This gives rise to a general correspondence between possibilistic security properties and closure conditions.
In our framework, possibilistic security properties are represented in a modular way as security predicates. Formally, a security predicate SP is either a single basic security predicate BSP, i.e. SP BSP or a conjunction of basic security predicates, i.e. SP BSP ½ BSP Ò . Each basic security predicate BSP demands that for any trace of the system there must be another trace ¼ which is compatible with the same observation and which fulfills a condition É, the closure requirement of BSP. The existence of ¼ , however, is only required if a condition Ê, the restriction of BSP, holds. This results in the following schema for the formal definition of basic security predicates:
Since there is a general correspondence between possibilistic security properties and closure conditions, as explained above, it is desirable to establish such a correspondence for basic security predicates (abbreviated by BSP in the sequel) as well. In order to achieve this, we have to impose an additional requirement on the definition of BSPs. Possibilistic security properties are represented as security predicates within our framework in a modular way. Definition 2 and 3 enforce a certain structure for such representations. In particular, this structure ensures that the correspondence between possibilistic security and closure conditions also exists in the framework. The schema for the definition of BSPs allows for inductive definitions. This enables us to distinguish two dimensions of BSPs when we instantiate the schema for BSPs (cf. Section 4). The expressiveness of our framework allows for a representation of the wellknown possibilistic security properties (cf. Section 5). The correspondence to closure conditions is the basis for the investigation of the compatibility of such security properties with other system properties (cf. Section 6) and for a stepwise development of secure systems (cf. Section 7).
Basic Security Predicates
In this section, we illustrate how to instantiate our schema for the definition of BSPs and present a collection of BSPs which will be used as examples in the remainder of the article. Two dimensions of BSPs are distinguished in Subsection 4.1 and 4.2 and, if possible, the BSPs in each dimension are ordered by implication. BSPs in the first dimension express that it is confidential that an event has occurred. Formally this corresponds to the possibility to delete this event without changing the observation. In the second dimension it is confidential that an event has not occurred which corresponds to the possibility to insert events. All BSPs presented, correspond to closure conditions. Our schema for BSPs ensures this correspondence for BSPs in general as we will show in Subsection 4.3. The distinction of two dimensions together with the ordering of BSPs helps to compare the various BSPs easily and provides useful orientation when BSPs are selected for the construction of security predicates.
Recall that we assume that only low-level events are observable for a low-level user. However, not all high-level events need to be confidential. Depending on the particular application, a BSP may be appropriate which ensures the confidentiality of only some high-level events and does not care if an occurrence of the others can be deduced. Nevertheless, in other cases it may be necessary to consider all high-level events as confidential. In this article, we restrict our considerations to two scenarios in which either all high-level events or (only) high-level inputs are confidential. An adaption of the definitions to other scenarios, where e.g. high-level outputs are confidential, is possible.
Removal and Stepwise Deletion of Events
BSPs which prevent a low-level user from inferring that certain high-level events have occurred are based on the possibility to remove these events from traces while preserving the resulting observation. In the sequel, we distinguish between BSPs which require the removal of all these events at once and BSPs which require their stepwise deletion. Each of these BSPs is defined using the schema from Definition 2 such that the satisfiability condition is fulfilled.
When defining BSPs, we employ a uniform naming scheme. If e.g. a BSP is based on removal or deletion of events then an 'Ê' or ' ' respectively occurs in its name. If only high-level inputs are affected then 'Á' is used and if all high-level events are affected then ' ' is used instead.
The basic security predicates RE (Removal of Events), RI (Removal of Inputs), and SRI (Strict Removal of Inputs) require a global removal of events. The BSP RE demands the removal of high-level events. Given ¾ Tr, it assures the existence of a low-level equivalent trace ¼ such that ¼ À is empty. ¼ results from by removing all high-level events, e.g. if is Ð ½ Ó ½ ½ Ð ¾ , then ¼ Ð ½ Ð ¾ must be a trace. In Figure 1 , we use a shorthand notation to abbreviate
In the shorthand notation, we omit quantifiers since they are clear from the schema for defining BSPs and just write Ê µ É. Unprimed variables are implicitly universally and
BSPs based on removal of events: RE´Trµ
BSPs based on stepwise deletion of events: DE´Trµ
Unprimed variables ( , «, ¬, ) are universally and primed ones ( 
Ù Ø
Note that there is no link between SDI/SRI and DE/RE in Figure 2 . Informally, the reason is that SDI and SRI require that high-level output and internal events are preserved when high-level input events are deleted/removed while DE and RE require that output and internal events are deleted/removed as well. This is reflected by the following counterexamples. For DE µ SRI consider the trace set 
Stepwise Insertion of Events
BSPs which prevent the low-level user from inferring that certain high-level events have not occurred, are based on the possibility to insert these events into traces while preserving the resulting low-level observation. We define BSPs which require the stepwise insertion of these events.
Again, we use a uniform naming scheme for BSPs. For all BSPs based on the stepwise insertion of events, an 'Á' occurs in the name. If only high-level inputs are inserted then an additional 'Á' is used and if all kinds of high-level events are inserted, then ' ' is used instead.
BSPs based on insertion of events: IE´Trµ
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BSPs based on insertion of admissible events: IAE´Trµ
¼ must be in LLES´Tr µ.
Figure 3. BSPs based on stepwise insertion of high-level events
The basic security predicates IE (Insertion of Events), II (Insertion of Inputs), BSII (Backwards Strict Insertion of Inputs), and SII (Strict Insertion of Inputs) require the stepwise insertion of events. These BSPs are, again, inductively defined. In Figure 3 , the predicate IE demands that an arbitrary high-level event can be inserted into a trace. Given ¾ Tr which can be divided into ¬ «such that « contains no high-level events, it assures, the existence of a low-level In general, IE rules out any meaningful system behaviour on the high-level. This problem can be solved by demanding that inserted events are admissible on the high-level, i.e. occur in some high-level behaviour. Note that this solution does not compromise security. In order to express high-level admissibility formally, we define HAdm À and HAdm À Á . To require high-level admissibility solves the problem pointed out previously. However, the resulting BSPs are still too strong since they prevent information flow from the low-to the high-level which we demonstrate by example.
Example 6. Like in Example 5, a system is considered which records input events. However, this time low-level inputs are recorded in the high-level output. Ð ½ Ó ½ and Ð ¾ Ó ¾ are possible traces of the system and so is the prefix Ð ½ of the first trace. Since Ó ¾ is a possible high-level behaviour, IHAE demands that Ð ½ Ó ¾ is a trace of the system, however, this trace violates the intended system behaviour. 
Remark 8.
We have claimed at the beginning of this section that our collection of BSPs can be easily extended based on the two scenarios which we have considered here, i.e. all events in À or only events in À Áare confidential. Technically, this can be achieved by replacing À Á with some other set À ¼ of high-level events in Figure 1 This allows for the easy extension of our collection of BSPs such that e.g. the case where all high-level outputs or only certain high-level events are confidential can be covered.
Induced Closure Operations
There is a correspondence between BSPs and closure operations. A closure operation constructs the closure of a given set by adding elements and a closure condition demands for a set that it is closed wrt. some criterion. Recall that this is also the underlying idea of possibilistic security. If a high-level behaviour is compatible with a given observation then certain other high-level behaviours must be compatible with it as well. For a basic introduction to closure operations and closure systems we refer to [3] . 
for example, would be another set which is closed wrt. BSDI. Note that the latter set is not a closed wrt. SDI.
Assembling Security Predicates
In this section, we illustrate how security predicates can be defined and demonstrate the expressiveness of our framework by describing several previously proposed definitions of security as security predicates, i.e. conjunctions of BSPs, from the preceding section. The defined security predicates are ordered with respect to their logical strength and will be used as examples in the remainder of this article. The modular construction within our framework helps us in achieving these results easily.
Generalized non-inference GNF [12] demands that a low-level user cannot infer that high-level inputs have occurred. It has been motivated by a limitation of noninference NF [16] which prevents not only information flow from the high-to the low-level but also certain kinds of information flow in the other direction. We will discuss information flow from the low-to the high-level in greater detail in Section 6. Generalized non-interference GNI [10] demands that any interleaving of the high-level input of one trace with the low-level behaviour of another trace can be made a possible trace by adapting the outputs. We use the definition of generalized non-interference from [12] in which a function interleave is used to construct the set of all possible interleavings for two traces. All of these definitions allow some information flow from the high-to the lowlevel. McLeans separability SEP [12] prevents any such information flow. A similar notion of security has been introduced by Foley [5] . However, separability is stronger than necessary because the perfect security property PSP [20] also prevents any information flow from the high-to the low-level. Furthermore, there is no weaker definition which shares this property [20] . PSP resulted from the observation that high-level admissibility restricts information flow from the low-to the high-level and that therefore general admissibility should be used instead.
Definition 12.

GNF´Trµ
All of these definitions of security can be expressed as security predicates in our framework. 
, Ø ½ , and construct Ø ¼ ¼ ¬ «.
Ù Ø
Theorem 13 demonstrates that all these previously proposed definitions of possibilistic security can be expressed in our framework and the distinction of two dimensions for BSPs provides us with an intuitive understanding. E.g. GNI demands that the low-level user cannot infer that any highlevel inputs have occurred (RI) or that a hl-admissible highlevel input has not occurred (IHAI). GNF, NF, GNI, and SEP can also be expressed by McLeans selective interleaving functions (sifs) [12, 14] . However, sifs are not expressive enough to define inductive definitions like PSP. interleave can only capture high-level admissibility. This was the main motivation for the definition of a new framework by Zakinthinos and Lee [20] . However, no correspondence exists between definitions of security and closure conditions in their framework. One benefit of our framework over [20] is that this correspondence exists as it does in the framework from [12, 14] . Each security predicate is a closure condition which induces a set of closure operations. Ä SP and Ð SP are defined accordingly. The correspondence to closure conditions will be the basis for our investigations in Section 6 and 7. Another improvement is the modular structure which allows us to achieve results like the following theorem easily from properties of the building blocks. The additional security predicate RI IAE in the theorem will be used in Section 6. Figure 5 . 
NF
Theorem 14. GNF, NF, GNI, GNI, SEP, PSP, and RI IAE are ordered by implication as depicted in
Ù Ø
Compatibility with other Properties
The compatibility of security with other properties is a critical issue. The specification of a secure system consists not only of a security property but also of other system properties. Usually, such system properties are modeled as sets of traces. Thus, a secure system can be specified as a pair ´È ËÈµ where È is a set of traces and Ë Èis a security predicate. For example, È could specify a bookkeeping system and Ë Èthe intended security property. If È is not closed for Ë Èthen È alone is an insecure specification. Simply constructing the closure Ð SP´È µ of È by adding traces leads to a secure specification which allows behaviours which a bookkeeping system is not supposed to have. In order to ensure the bookkeeping functionality we, therefore, have to construct a subset È ¼ È which is closed for Ë È. This leads to a specification of a secure bookkeeping system. Unfortunately, È ¼ may allow no traces, i.e. be an inconsistent specification, require the system to stop after some steps, or just restrict the possible behaviours in a less severe but still undesirable way. Clearly, a specifier should be aware of any such restrictions. Therefore it is of interest with which kinds of properties the various security predicates are compatible or incompatible.
The correspondence between security predicates and closure conditions gives rise to a formal definition of compatibility which we use as the basis for our investigations. We illustrate the approach at several examples which require information flow from the low-to the high-level for the security predicates from the previous section. The results are also interesting in their own right. It turns out that a complete prevention of information flow from the high-to the low-level implies that certain kinds of information flow in the other direction are also restricted. If such information flow is required then complete security must be sacrificed. We propose a new security predicate PGSP which can be used to gradually allow for information flow from low to high while minimizing the resulting loss of security. 
Closures and Compatibility
Information Flow from Low-to High
The two-level security policy Pol À Ä requires that there is no information flow from the high-to the low-level, i.e. À Ä. It does not restrict information flow in the other direction Ä À. In fact, such information flow is often required, however, many well-known definitions of possibilistic security restrict or prevent it completely. We demonstrate, using concrete examples, that it depends on the specific kind of information flow if a security predicate is compatible or not.
In particular, we investigate the auditing of low-level events on the high-level. Here, each low-level event Ð is recorded by a corresponding high-level output Ó´Ðµ from a set of recording events À Ç Ö À Ç . We distinguish three variations of such properties, depending on when the recording event must occur. In IRec (immediate recording), the recording event Ó´Ðµ must occur immediately after the low-level event Ð has occurred. In SRec (stepwise recording) Ó´Ðµ must occur before the next low-level event Ð ¼ occurs. 
For auditing, a low-level event enforces a high-level event.
The prevention of a high-level event by the occurrence of a low-level event is an alternative type of information flow. A system where a guard must pass a checkpoint within a specific time period is an example which requires this type of information flow. If the guard passes the checkpoint in time, then no alarm should be invoked, otherwise, the alarm may be invoked. We distinguish two variants. In IPI (immediate prevention of input) the next event after Ð must not be a high-level input from the set À ÁÐµ of prevented inputs and in IPO (immediate prevention of output) the next event after Ð must not be a high-level output from the set À ḈÐµ.
These properties are formalized as follows: A proof of Lemma 18 is contained in the appendix. The next theorem follows directly from Lemma 16 and 18. The modular structure of our framework has simplified this proof considerably. The only cases that we had to prove (in Lemma 18) are the ones which are underlined in Figure 6 , i.e. only 27 out of 95 cases had to be investigated. 
Figure 6. Compatibility of BSPs
The following theorem follows from Theorem 13, Lemma 16, and Theorem 19.
Theorem 20.
NF and PSP are incompatible with IRec and SRec. GNI is incompatible with IRec and IPI. SEP is incompatible with IRec, SRec, Rec, IPI, and IPO.
Theorem 20 might suggest that all established security properties, except for GNF, are incompatible with information flow Ä À. SEP is not even compatible with a single one of the investigated kinds of information flow. However, depending on the application, some of these incompatibilities might be acceptable. Our investigation identifies that the problem for PSP is the use of RE. To use any of BSDI, DI, or RI would solve the problem. This is the motivation for the definition of PGSP in Subsection 6.3.
The proof of Lemma 21 is contained in the appendix. 
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We have demonstrated at several examples how to prove the compatibility or incompatibility of a security predicate with a property and how to exploit the modularity of our framework during this process. The results are also interesting in their own right. We have shown that the compatibility of a security predicate with information flow from the low-to the high-level depends on the particular kind of information flow because the results for well-known definitions differ for the various examples (Theorem 20 and 22). PSP is incompatible with certain kinds of information flow from Ä to À. According to Theorem 2 in [20] there is no security property which is weaker than PSP and ensures complete security, i.e. prevents all information flow from À to Ä. Thus, one cannot have both, complete security and information flow like IRec or SRec.
The Pretty Good Security Predicate
We have demonstrated in the previous subsection that certain kinds of information flow become impossible when complete security is required. Thus, for information flow like in IRec or SRec one must sacrifice complete security. Clearly, it is desirable not to give up more security than necessary. This is the motivation for the definition of a new security property, the pretty good security predicate PGSP.
Theorem 22 (1) demonstrates that RI IAE shares the compatibilities of GNF, i.e. it is compatible with all the properties which we have considered. On the one hand, it is strictly stronger than GNF and, thus, more secure. On the other hand, it provides only slightly less security than PSP does (which ensures complete security). Therfore, RI IAE is an attractive candidate for a security predicate. We define the pretty good security predicate by
PGSP RI IAE
Since PGSP is weaker than PSP, it must allow for some (undesired) flow of information from the high-to the lowlevel. It is of interest to identify to which extent and by which means high-level behaviour can be deduced for a system which satisfies PGSP. By looking at the basic building blocks we see that the use of RI instead of RE can be the only reason for such information flow. Thus, PGSP allows the low-level user to infer that a high-level output or internal event has occurred. Figure 5 . In order to receive a security predicate, as strong as possible, one must choose À ¼ as small as possible. However, it is essential that À ¼ really contains all high level events which are concerned with the processing of low-level information because, otherwise, the compatibilities may be lost. Note that PGSP PGSP ÀÒÀ Á and PSP PGSP .
A look at the BSPs from which PGSP À ¼ is composed yields an intuitive understanding: By observing a system which is PGSP À ¼ -secure, a low-level user cannot infer that an admissible high-level event has not occurred or that a high-level event in À ÒÀ ¼ has occurred. However, he might be able to infer that a high-level event from À ¼ has occurred, i.e. events which are concerned with the processing of lowlevel events must not be confidential.
Stepwise Development of Secure Systems
A stepwise development process for secure systems is desirable. In stepwise development, one starts with an abstract specification and refines it in several steps to a concrete specification of a system which then can be implemented. However, unlike other system properties, security properties need to be expressed as sets of trace sets and cannot be expressed simply by sets of traces, thus, they are outside the Alpern-Schneider framework of safety and liveness properties [12] . Moreover, Jacob [9] showed that, in general, a security ordering is neither monotonic nor antimonotonic with respect to the subset relation. Since the subset relation is the basis for refinement, this gives rise to the refinement paradox which says that the refinement of a secure system need not be secure. Thus, in general, security is not preserved under refinement.
The refinement paradox is a major obstacle for a stepwise development of secure systems. However, our general correspondence between security predicates and closure conditions can be used as the basis for such a stepwise development. Starting with an abstract specification Ë ´ Á Ç Tr µ, which has been proved to be secure, one constructs more concrete specifications. In each step one constructs a specification Ë ´ Á Ç Tr µ which must be proved to be closed wrt. the corresponding closure condition or, alternatively, the closure of Ë can be constructed using an appropriate closure operation. While this idea might sound simple, in theory, it can be difficult to ap-ply in practice. Therefore, it is important to identify specialized refinement operators which preserve security. In the sequel we demonstrate that the intersection of specifications is such a refinement operator which preserves certain security predicates. The correspondence to closure conditions is very helpful in achieving this result.
The following theorem shows that the intersection of two specifications which are closed under a closure operation Ð is again closed under Ð . When constructing a refinement Ë of a specification Ë , which is secure with respect to SP, then one must again prove that Ë is secure. Corollary 24 states that we do not need to re-prove security if we use intersection because intersection preserves security.
If SP does not have a unique closure operation (cf. Theorem 11) then Corollary 24 is not applicable. In this case one should select one particular closure operation Ðin Ä SP and use Theorem 23. This requires that the security of specifications which are composed has been proved wrt. the same closure operation. While the stepwise development of a secure system from its specification, i.e. the top-down approach, has been somewhat handicapped by the refinement paradox, the bottomup approach, i.e. the modular construction of a secure system from components has received considerable attention, e.g. [10, 12, 14, 17, 19] . If the composition of secure components yields again a system which is secure then the security of composed systems can be proved in a modular fashion. This reduces the complexity when reasoning about security. Another motivation is that it allows for the use of off-the-shelf components which are certified to fulfill a certain security property but for which the complete system documentation is not disclosed. Composed systems are a natural area of application for possibilistic security because they are often non-deterministic, like distributed systems in general. However, an investigation of system composition within our framework is outside the scope of this article and we point to the existing work mentioned above.
Discussion
We discuss the relation to previously proposed frameworks for possibilistic security by McLean [12, 14] and Zakinthinos/Lee [20] as well as to a comparison of possibilistic security properties by Focardi and Gorrieri [4] . Finally, we summarize criteria for selecting a security predicate.
McLean uses traces that are sequences of states (instead of events) as basis for his framework of selective interleaving functions. A selective interleaving function (sif) takes two traces as arguments and returns a trace. The type of a sif decides from which trace the values of a state object are taken for the resulting trace or if they may be chosen arbitrarily. In McLeans framework each definition corresponds to a closure condition, i.e. the set of traces must be closed under a sif of a specific type. The expressiveness of his framework is limited since sifs can only express high-level admissibility and cannot capture inductive definitions (cf. Section 5), which are required in PGSP as well as in PSP.
The framework of Zakinthinos and Lee [20] uses a schema for the representation of security properties which is based on the notion of a low-level equivalence set (like ours). Their framework is more expressive than the one by McLean and can capture inductive definitions as well as admissibility. However, the correspondence between security properties and closure conditions is lost. Their schema provides less structure than ours for the representation of security properties and does not incorporate a satisfiability condition (cf. Definition 2).
In our framework, we re-establish the correspondence between security properties and closure conditions by the satisfiability condition in the schema for BSPs (cf. Definition 2). The quantification of , «, ¬, , and ¼ allowed us to express such a satisfiability condition. The distinction of a restriction Ê and a closure requirement É provides more structure for the definition of a BSP and for proving satisfiability conditions. Apparently, this additional structure could restrict the expressiveness of our framework in comparison to the one by Zakinthinos and Lee. The reader might be curious since we have not formalized McCulloughs original definition of generalized noninterference or non-deducibility output security [8] which can be expressed in the framework by Zakinthinos and Lee. However, both of these definitions of security could also be expressed as security predicates in our framework, although this requires the definition of further BSPs. 3 
Focardi and Gorrieri [4] investigate various possibilistic security properties in a process algebra based on CCS [15] . Therefore, internal events are not distinguished but rather identified with a single hidden event . In particular, nondeterministic non-interference (which is similar to GNF discussed in this paper), strong non-deterministic noninterference (similar to NF), two-level non-deducibility on inputs (similar to GNI), lts-restrictiveness, lts-correctability, and non-deducibility on compositions are compared. Interestingly, the comparison is not limited to trace equivalence but also covers other notions of behavioural equivalence, in particular weak bisimulation. However, unlike in [12, 14, 20] or this article, no general schema for the definition of possibilistic security (like McLeans selective interleaving functions, the security properties from [20] , or our security predicates) is provided which we consider to be a necessary component of a general framework for security. We now return to the issue of selecting an appropriate definition of security which has been mentioned at various places in this article. We have argued that the choice of an appropriate definition depends on the application and that there is no definition which can be recommended as the optimal one for all purposes. As usual in the development of secure systems one has to analyze which information flows are critical and what threads exist. This might result e.g. in the decision that only high-level inputs or outputs must be hidden from low-level users. The compatibility of security with other system properties is critical because if the two are incompatible, a stronger system property must be implemented. If one wants to use off-the-shelf components which are certified to satisfy a given security property then the chosen definition of security and the one ensured by the component must fit together. The composability of specifications for a stepwise development process and the composability of components is important for modular system construction. Another issue which -to our knowledge -so far has not been addressed in the literature (including this article) is, how difficult it is to actually prove that a system fulfills a possibilistic security property. This certainly is an important area for future work.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new framework for investigating and comparing definitions of possibilistic security, which can be assembled within our framework in a modular way and provided a variety of BSPs as building blocks for such definitions. New building blocks can be added using a general schema for the definition of BSPs. All definitions expressed in earlier frameworks [12, 14, 20] could also be expressed in our framework. Our framework is more expressive than the one by McLean [12, 14] and there is a general correspondence between definitions of security and closure conditions which is not present in the framework by Zakinthinos and Lee [20] . We have investigated the compatibility of the various definitions of security with system properties apart from security at several examples which require information flow from the low-to the high-level. In order to overcome limitations of the perfect security property PSP, we have derived the pretty good security predicate PGSP. We also indicated how a stepwise and modular development of secure systems is possible in our framework and demonstrated the benefits of using intersection. Finally, we have provided criteria for the selection of an appropriate security predicate.
In future work we intend to investigate how systems can be proved to fulfill a possibilistic security property. Another area of interest are intransitive security policies for non-deterministic systems. 
